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ESSAY

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN POSTCOLONIAL SOCIETIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE PROPOSED
EXPANSION OF THE PANAMA CANAL
Carmen G. Gonzalez*

Vamos a hacer de estas instalaciones recuperadas (Canal de Panamdt) y de esos kil6metros cuadrados (dreas de la Antigua Zona del
Canal), el uso mds colectivo possible. Y
cuando digo el uso mIs colectivo, les estoy
manifestando aquel uso en el que la mayor
parte del pueblo panamefio
pueda disfrutar
1
del esfuerzo de su lucha.
Panama's destiny has been shaped by its geographic
location at the crossroads of international trade.2 Lacking
*Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I would like
to thank Daniel Suman, Frank Valdes and Colin Crawford for organizing an enlightening one week seminar in Panama during which the
Canal expansion and many other topics were explored. I am especially
grateful to the many Panamanian scholars, government officials and
non-governmental organization representatives who took the time to
meet with us and to share their thoughts and insights.
1President Omar Torrijos, Speech before the Panamanian National
Assembly, August 19, 1977, (quoted in Marco A. Ganddsegui, Los
Retos Que Enfrentan el Paisy el Canalde Panamcd, 113 TAREAS 39
(2003), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/tarl 13/marco.rtf.) ("We
are going to make the most collective use possible of these recovered
installations (the Panama Canal) and of these square kilometers (the
former Canal Zone). And when I say the most collective use possible, I
mean the use which permits the majority of Panamanians to reap the
rewards of their struggle.").
2 See WALTER LAFEBER, THE PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HIS-

TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1989).
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mineral wealth or extensive arable lands, the country has
prospered or declined based on the use made by others of
the country's major resource-the Panama Canal.3 The
Panama Canal is a potent symbol of Panamanian identity, a
reminder of Panama's lengthy colonial history, and an
important
generator of income for the modem Panamanian
4
nation.
On December 31, 1999, the United States officially
transferred the Panama Canal to the Panamanian govemment. 5 This transfer was the culmination of a lengthy
struggle for Panamanian
sovereignty and
selfdetermination. 6 With the departure of the United States,
Panamanians would finally have the opportunity to shape
their economic and political destiny subject to the constraints imposed by the global economic order.
The transfer, however, was not a panacea. Even
after the colonial power departed, the institutional and
ideological vestiges of colonialism were not easily eradicated.7 Commentators wondered whether the Panamanian
government would operate the Canal in the interests of the
Panamanian people-as President Omar Torrijos had
hoped-or whether the Canal would be managed just as the
United States had managed it. 8 This question took on particular urgency when the Panamanian government proposed
to expand the Panama Canal in order to increase the Ca9
nal's competitiveness and efficiency.
3See id.
4 See id. at 222-23.
5 See JOHN LINDSAY-POLAND,

EMPERORS IN THE JUNGLE: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE U.S. IN PANAMA 172 (2003).
6 See generally LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 63-102, 222-23.
7 See MAHMUD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY
AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 286 (1996) (observ-

ing that the post-colonial state often reproduces key elements of the
colonial state).
8 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 190.
9See Panama Canal Authority, Proposal for the Expansion of the Panama Canal: Third Set of Locks, Apr. 24, 2006,
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On April 24, 2006, six years after the transfer, Panamanian authorities announced a $5.25 billion plan to
expand the Canal by constructing a third set of locks.' 0 In
accordance with Panamanian law, the expansion proposal
was submitted to a popular referendum on October 22,
2006 and was overwhelmingly approved." However, the
referendum was plagued with procedural irregularities that
raised questions about the legitimacy of the pro-expansion
outcome-including the absence of a comprehensive assessment of the environmental and socioeconomic impacts
of the controversial project.12
This article will examine the expansion of the Panama Canal as a case study on two distinct but interrelated
challenges faced by post-colonial societies. The first is
how to develop natural resources in Foreword-looking
ways consistent with long-term national self-interest despite the tendency of colonial practices and institutions to
persist long after the colonial power has departed. The
second is how to use environmental impact assessment law
as a tool to enhance public and governmental decisionmaking in the development planning process.
The article is divided into three parts. Part I introduces the Canal expansion case study and describes the
controversial referendum. Part II discusses the role of
environmental impact assessment in development planning,
explains the Panamanian laws and regulations applicable to
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/documentos/propuesta/acpexpansion-proposal.pdf.
'0 See id.
1
'See Marc Lacey, PanamaniansVote Overwhelmingly to Expand
Canal,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at A3.
12 See NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs, Panama
Canal
Expansion Approved in Heavily CriticizedReferendum, Oct. 26, 2006;
Eric Jackson, EnvironmentalDefense of Torrijos-Alemin Zubieta Plan
Collapses,The Panama News, Sep. 17 - Oct. 7, 2006, Vol. 12, Num.
18 at
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v 12/issue_18/news_01.html.
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environmental impact assessment, and analyzes and critiques the application of this legal framework to the proposed expansion of the Panama Canal. Part III examines
the ways in which the colonial legacy distorts the development planning process and discusses strategies that might
be deployed to resist the re-imposition of colonial practices
and institutions. Drawing upon the Canal expansion case
study, Part III recommends specific amendments to Panama's environmental impact assessment laws and regulations designed to enhance governmental decision-making
and to promote public participation in the development
planning process.
I. The Panama Canal Expansion Project: Introduction
to the Case Study
In order to examine the multi-layered controversy
over the expansion of the Panama Canal, it is essential to
place the dispute in historical context. This Part presents a
brief history of the Panama Canal, summarizes the arguments for and against the expansion project, and discusses
the highly contentious referendum.
A. Brief History of the Panama Canal
From the earliest days of Spanish colonial rule until
the present, Panama has played a pivotal role in international trade.' 3 During the Spanish empire, Spanish ships
arrived in the Caribbean port of Portobelo, where their
goods were unloaded and hauled by mule across the isthmus to Panama City for distribution to the Spanish colonies
on the Pacific Coast-from San Francisco in the north to
Santiago in the south. 14 Likewise, Peruvian silver was
13

14

See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 3.

See INSTITUTO DEL TERCER MUNDo, GUIA DEL MUNDO: EL MUNDO

DESDE EL SUR 453 (2001) [hereinafter Instituto].
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transported across the isthmus from Panama City to the
Caribbean coast for shipment to Seville.1 5
In 1821, Panama declared its independence from
Spain and joined the Republic of Gran Colombia (a union
of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador). 16 When this entity
was dissolved in 1830, Panama became part of Colombia. 17
As the U.S. economy expanded in the 1820s, U.S.
businessmen began to eye Panama as a possible location
for a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. i1 U.S.
interest in Panama intensified with the discovery of gold in
California in the 1840s. 19 Because the U.S. transcontinental railroad would not be completed until 1869, U.S. financiers constructed a railroad between Panama City (on the
Pacific Ocean) and the city of Col6n (on the Atlantic
Ocean) between 1851 and 1855 to facilitate the movement
of people and goods to and from California. 20 In its fourteen years of operation, the railroad carried 600,000 passengers and $750 million in gold bullion between the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts.21
The first attempt to construct a canal across Panama
22
was undertaken by the French between 1880 and 1889.
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the famed architect of the Suez Canal, attempted to construct a sea-level canal based on the
Suez model. 23 De Lesseps abandoned the effort in 1889

15 See JOHN MAJOR, PRIZE POSSESSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
PANAMA CANAL 1903-1979, 9 (1993).
16 See U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(CIA), THE WORLD

PANAMA, availableat
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pm.html.
17 See id.
FACTBOOK:

18See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 7-8.
19 See id. at 10.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22
See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 77.
23 See id.
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when disease, financial mismanagement, and construction
setbacks doomed his project to failure. 24
The project was taken up by the United States,
which convinced the Colombian ambassador in Washington, DC to sign a treaty giving the U.S. a 99-year lease on a
six-mile wide canal zone in exchange for a $10 million fee
and annual payments of $250,000.25 Hoping for a better
deal, the Colombian senate unanimously rejected the treaty.
The United States supported Panama's November 1903
Declaration of Independence from Colombia and dispatched the marines to prevent 26Colombian troops from
repressing the Panamanian revolt.
Contrary to popular mythology, Panama's bid for
independence was the product of a lengthy struggle against
Colombia. It was not simply engineered by the United
States at the last minute in order to construct the Canal.
Panamanians had rebelled against Colombia in 1830 and
1831, and perhaps fifty times between 1840 and 1903.28
These rebellions were nurtured by a nationalist ideology
driven by the "geographical myth" that Panama was predestined to control one of the world's greatest trade
routes. 29 This ideology also had a powerful anti-imperialist
element, which was directed initially against Colombia and
30
would later be directed against the United States.
U.S. support for Panamanian independence came at
a great price. In exchange for a $10 million fee and a
$250,000 annual annuity, the Panamanian government was
forced to sign the egregiously one-sided Hay-Bunau Varilla
Treaty (negotiated on Panama's behalf by the French entrepreneur Philippe Bunau Varilla), which gave the United
24

See id.; LAFEBER, supra note

2, at 11.

25 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at
26 See Instituto, supra note
14.
21 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at
28 See id. at 20.
29

18.
19-20.

See id.

30 See id. at 20-21.
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States perpetual authority over a ten-mile wide canal zone
and the right to intervene in Panama to maintain public

31

order "in case the Republic of Panama should not be, in the
judgment of the United States, able to maintain such order." 32 Panama surrendered sovereign control of the Canal
Zone, and granted the United States the authority to operate
the Canal Zone "as if it were the sovereign of the territory."
33 The treaty also gave the United States the perpetual right
to use Panama's rivers, lakes and streams for Canal-related
purposes and to use, occupy and control any lands outside
the Canal Zone needed for the construction, operation or
protection of the Canal. 34 Finally, the treaty required Panama to permit free immigration to the Canal Zone by
workers (and their families) of every nationality and pro35
hibited Panama from subjecting them to military service.
The influence of the United States in Panama extended far beyond the Canal Zone. In order to ensure that
the Canal construction would not be disrupted by social
unrest, the United States supported an elite white oligarchy,
crippled the opposition political party, disbanded the army,
and assumed responsibility for protecting the oligarchy
against both internal and external enemies. 36 Using defense
of the Panama Canal as a pretext, the United States intervened militarily in Panama in 1912, 1915, 1918, and 1925
to repress riots and demonstrations. 37 The U.S. condoned
widespread election fraud in the name of political stabil31 See

The Convention Between the United States and Panama for the

Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans (1903) at arts. II, XXIV, availableat

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1903panama.html [hereinafter,
Hay-Bunau Varilla Convention]; LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 28-33
(describing the events that led to the treaty).
32 Hay-Bunau Varilla Convention, supra note 31, at art. VII.

" Id. at art. III.
34 See id. at art. I, IV.
31 See id. at art. XXII.
36

See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 40.

" See id. at 56-58.
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38
ity-thereby thwarting Panama's political development.
Finally, the United States dictated Panama's foreign policy
and dominated Panama economically. 39 In effect, Panama

became a U.S. colony.40

The Panama Canal was officially opened on August
15, 1914, and generated huge savings for the U.S. shipping
industry.4 ' In addition to reducing by the trip between New
York and San Francisco nearly 8000 miles, the Canal
charged very modest tolls. 42 Indeed, the United States did
not increase tolls between 1914 and431973 in order to subsidize American shipping companies.
The United States maintained a powerful military
presence in Panama, with fourteen military bases and an
average of 7400 troops between the two world wars.44 By
1943, 63,000 troops were stationed in Panama.45 During
the Cold War, Panama was the site of the U.S. Southern
Command, the command center for U.S. military activities
in Central America and South America. 46 In 1946, the
School of the Americas was established in the Canal
Zone. 47 Between 1950 and 1986, the School of the Americas would train over 57,000 Latin American army and
48
police officers in counter-insurgency operations.
After a period of prosperity during the Second
World War, the Panamanian economy suffered a severe
decline, and was in a state of crisis by 1960. 49 The country
depended on two major sources of revenue. The first was
38 See id. at 54-55.

3 See id. at 58-61.

40

See id. at 52-54.

41 See Instituto, supra note 14,
42 See LAFEBER, supra note 2,

at 453.
at 48.

41 See id.

44 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 190.
41 See id. at 45.
46 See id. at 106.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 102.
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banana production, which was controlled by United Fruit;
the second was the North American military-industrial
complex in the Canal Zone, which employed Panamanian
workers and purchased goods from Panamanian merchants. 50 The presence of the Canal Zone created two distinct worlds within a small geographic area:
the
prosperous, air-conditioned First World dominated by the
United States, and the steamy, slum-ridden, povertystricken Third World ruled by an entrenched and corrupt
oligarchy (with U.S. support). 51 As discussed in Part III of
this article, this image of the two Panamas would have a
subtle but powerful impact on the management of the Panama Canal after the transition to Panamanian control.
The 1930s, 1940s and 1950s were characterized by
rising nationalism in Panama as the middle class rebelled
against the oligarchy and demanded better terms in the
relationship between Panama and the United States. 52 In
1958, Panamanian university students entered the Canal
Zone to plant Panamanian flags at strategic locations, but
the flags were promptly removed by Canal police.5 3 Later
that month several students were shot as they participated
in demonstrations demanding Panamanian sovereignty over
the Canal.54 The following year, Panamanian university
students again marched into the Canal Zone to plant Panamanian flags. 55 When one student was arrested and others
were repelled by Canal police and by U.S. troops with fixed
bayonets, rioting broke out in Panama City.56 The riots did
not stop until the Panamanian National Guard was called in
to restore order. 57 In response to the political turmoil, Pres0 See id.

51 See id. at 83-84, 101-05, 118-19.
52

See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 63-98.

51 See id. at 98-99.
14

See id. at 99.

51 See id. at 100.
56
17

See id.
See id.
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ident Eisenhower sent his brother Milton on a fact-finding
mission to Panama, where one Panamanian official explained the situation as follows:
You in the United States inherited vast mineral wealth .... Africa was given gold and
diamonds. The Middle East is rich in oil.
God gave Panama nothing but a waterway.
We must make a living from our own resources as others have from theirs.58
The deadliest riots took place in 1964 after several
hundred Panamanian university students marched peacefully into the Canal Zone to demand that the Panamanian
flag be exhibited alongside the U.S. flag at Balboa High
School.59 When four to five hundred waiting North Americans confronted the students, violence broke out, and the
Panamanian flag was torn. 60 As rumors of the confrontation swept Panama City, as many as 30,000 Panamanians
marched into the streets, congregating in the area near the
Canal Zone. 6 1 U.S. troops took up battle positions and
exchanged gunfire with snipers. 62 Mobs of irate Panamanians responded by ransacking and setting fire to U.S. businesses in Panama City, overturning and burning
automobiles with Canal Zone license plates, and besieging
the U.S. Embassy. 63 The violence quickly spread into CoDuring four days of
16n and the interior of the country.
rioting, twenty-four Panamanians and four U.S. soldiers

58 Id. at 99 (omission in original).
59 See id. at 108.
60 See id; Luis MURILLO, THE NORIEGA MESS: THE DRUGS, THE
CANAL AND WHY AMERICA INVADED 214
61See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 108.

(1995).

See id.
See id. at 109; MURILLO, supra note 60, at 215.
64 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 109.
62

63
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lost their lives. 65 Over two hundred Panamanians and
eighty-five North Americans were wounded.66
Panamanians increasingly demanded complete sovereignty over the Canal. 67 When General Omar Torrijos
assumed control of the Panamanian government in 1968,
the struggle to wrest control of the Canal from the United
States was elevated to the international stage. 68 Torrijos

sought and obtained support for his cause from other Latin
American countries and the Non-Aligned Movement. 69 He
shrewdly persuaded the United Nations Security Council to
hold its March 1973 meeting in Panama instead of New
York City, and used the meeting to focus world attention
on the canal issue. 70 Delegates were given the opportunity
to see for themselves the stark contrast between the manicured lawns and air-conditioned bungalows of
the Canal
71
Zone, and the wretched slums across the street.
When Jimmy Carter was elected President of the
United States, he made the Canal question one of his top
diplomatic priorities. 72 After difficult negotiations and an
arduous battle to obtain U.S. Senate approval, the Panama
Canal Treaty of 1977 (the "Panama Canal Treaty") and the
See id.
See id.
67 See Instituto, supra note 14, at 454.
65

66

68

See id.

See id.
See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 142.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 150. Carter was determined to negotiate a successful Canal
69

70

treaty for several reasons. First, he wanted to demonstrate that the
United States could work constructively with developing countries and

thereby outmaneuver the Soviet Union. Second, he believed that the
Canal's strategic significance had declined while its potential to ignite
conflict with Panama had increased. Third, he regarded Torrijos as an
ideal negotiating partner ("reasonable and able to control his own

people"), and did not want to jeopardize Torrijos' position in Panama.
Finally, he viewed the negotiation and ratification of a Canal treaty as
the litmus test of his ability to manage foreign affairs. See id. at 158.
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Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation

of the Canal (the "Neutrality Treaty") were ratified by the
U.S. Senate on April 18, 1978. 73 Torrijos had obtained a
Canal treaty, but on terms far less favorable than he had
hoped.74 The Canal would not be handed over to Panama
until the year 2000. 75 Moreover, the U.S. Senate had added
a condition during the ratification process that permitted the
United States to intervene militarily in Panama to reopen
the Canal if the Canal were closed for any reason even after
the year 2000.76

On December 31, 1999, Panamanian president
Mireya Moscoso accepted the formal transfer of the Canal
to the Panamanian nation at a ceremony on the steps of the
Canal administration building. 77 At the time of the transfer,
nearly forty percent of Panamanians lived below the poverty line,78 and Panama had the second most unequal distri-

bution of income in Latin America (after Brazil).79 One
commentator rightfully queried whether the future of the
Canal would be determined by the needs of international
maritime interests or by the needs of the majority of PanaIn order to formulate a preliminary answer to
manians.
this question, it is useful to consider the Canal's physical

71 See id. at 113-15, 145, 148, 159, 178-79, 182. The transfer of the
Canal to Panama was so controversial in the United States that the vote
in the Senate was 68-32 in favor of ratification-barely satisfying the
requisite two-thirds majority. Id. at 182. See also Panama Canal Treaty,
U.S. - C.Z., Sept. 7, 1977, 33 U.S.T. 47; Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, U.S.-C.Z.,
Sept. 7, 1977, 33 U.S.T. 11 [hereinafter Neutrality Treaty].
74 See LAFEBER, supra note 2 at 186.

75 See Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 73, arts. 11(2), XIII(1).
76 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 178-81.
77 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 172.
78 See THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 16 (estimating the popula-

tion below the poverty rate in 1999 at 37 percent).
79 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 176.
8 See id. at 184.
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characteristics and the contentious debate on whether or not
to expand the Canal.
B. The Canal Expansion Proposal and Its Critics
The Panama Canal stretches fifty miles, connecting
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through numerous artificial
channels, three lakes, and a series of locks. 81 Every year
14,000 vessels pass through the Canal, accounting for approximately five percent of the world's trade. 82 Panamanian authorities predict that the Panama Canal will reach its
maximum capacity between 2009 and 2012, and will be
incapable of handling increased ship traffic without a decline in the quality of service. 83 Ships attempting to traverse the Canal are already experiencing significant delays,
and these delays are predicted to worsen as trade volumes
continue to expand.
Additionally, the Panama Canal can only handle socalled Panamex ships-vessels specifically designed to fit
through the Canal's existing locks and capable of carrying
up to 5000 containers. 85 However, with the expansion of
81 See

Global Market Brief: The Panama CanalExpansion, Oct. 26,

2006, http://www.stratfor.con/global_ marketbrief panama canal expansion.

See Larry Luxner, As Panama Plans CanalExpansion, Neighboring
Countries Eye Alternatives, WASHINGTON DIPLOMAT, Mar. 2007,
availableat http://www.washdiplomat.com/March%202007/
a7 03 07.html
83 See Proposalfor the Expansion of the PanamaCanal,supra note 9,
at 34.
84 See id. at 36.
85 See Global Market Brief supra note 81; Lome Matalon, Panama
CanalExpansion Spurs EnvironmentalDebate,NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, June 27, 2007,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/06/ 070627-panamacanal.html; PanamaApproves CanalExpansion, BBC NEWS, July 15,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/5182472.stm.
82

HeinOnline -- 4 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 315 2008

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 316

trade between Asia and the Americas, an increasing percentage of the world's cargo is being transported on postPanamex vessels capable of carrying up to 12,000 containers. 86 Unable to traverse the Panama Canal, these postPanamex vessels currently unload goods from Asia at ports
on the U.S. West Coast for road or rail transport to the
eastern United States, or travel through the Suez Canal.87
While only approximately one hundred vessels (or ten
percent of all shipping fleets) currently exceed the capacity
of the Panama Canal, it is anticipated that
the number of
88
post-Panamex ships will continue to grow.
In light of anticipated increases in trade volume and
ship size, Panamanian authorities proposed to expand the
Panama Canal in order to strengthen the Canal's competitive position vis-A-vis alternative routes and in order to
increase the efficiency of the Canal's operations. 89 The
expansion project, estimated to cost $5.25 million, consists
of adding a third lane to the Panama Canal, constructing
new lock facilities on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides,
and widening and deepening existing navigation channels. 90 Panamanian authorities contend that the project will
pay for itself through toll increases, will generate ten million dollars in additional toll revenues through 2025, will
employ 6500 to 7000 additional workers during the peak
construction years, and will produce an economic boom in
Panama that will generate an additional 250,000 jobs by
2025.91
86 See Global Market Brief supra note 81; Matalon, supra note 85;

BBC
NEWS, supra note 85.
87
See Gary Corbin, Panama CanalExpansion and the Global Economy, GLOBAL ENVISION, Nov. 20, 2006,
http://globalenvision.org/library/3/1339.
88 See id.; Global Market Brief supra note 81.
89 See Proposalforthe Expansion of the
Panama Canal,supra note 9,
at 31, 39-40.
90 See id. at 3-5, 10.
"' See id. at 57, 61, 66-68.
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Critics of the project paint a far gloomier picture.
First, they disagree with the government's claim that the
Canal will shortly reach full capacity and question the need
for the project. 92 Second, they contend that the government
has underestimated the cost of the project and has overestimated the project's future revenues. 93 Third, they predict
that the project will result in a net economic loss and that
the Panamanian elite will siphon off the project's benefits
while imposing an enormous financial burden on the
Panamanian nation. 94 Fourth, they contend that the project
will squander resources needed for health, education, transportation, and other national priorities. 95 Finally, the project's opponents predict an ecological disaster that could
result in deforestation, loss of biological diversity, and
salinization of the water supply of the Panama City metropolitan area. 96 These arguments are explored in greater
detail in Part II, Section D of this article. They are mentioned here to underscore the controversy surrounding the
expansion proposal and lay the groundwork for the discussion of the referendum.
C. The Panama Canal Authority and the Canal
Expansion Referendum
The referendum on the proposed expansion of the
Panama Canal must be understood in the context of the
unique constitutional status of the governmental entity
responsible for the Canal's operation and management. In
See Roberto N. Mndez, Por Qu6 Panamd Debe Decir "No" a la
Propuestadel Tercer Juego de Esclusas, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec.
2006), available at http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/
ar/libros/panama/cela/ tareas/tar 124/06mendez.pdf.
92

9' See id.
94 See id.
" See id.
96 See Panama Canal Expansion Approved in Heavily CriticizedReferendum, supra note 12.
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recognition of the important economic role of the Panama

Canal and of the Canal's significance as a symbol of Panamanian nationhood, the Panamanian Constitution declares
the Panama Canal the "inalienable patrimony of the Panamanian nation," 97 and creates an autonomous institution,
the Panama Canal Authority (Autoridad del Canal de Panamd, or ACP), to "operate the Canal in a manner that is
safe continuous, efficient and profitable." 98 The ACP is
autonomous in at least three distinct ways. First, the ACP's
administrators are insulated from partisan politics by the
constitutional requirement that the first board members be
appointed to staggered terms. 99 Second, while the ACP
makes annual payments to the Panamanian national treasury based on Canal revenues, the ACP's budget is separate
from the national budget.' 00 Third, the ACP's employees
are subject to a merit-based employment regime similar to
the regime in place prior to the transfer of the Canal from
the United States to Panama.'
The administrative structure and specific responsibilities of the ACP are detailed in
the Organic Law of the Panama Canal Authority, National
02
Assembly Law No. 19 (the Organic Law).1
The Panamanian Constitution makes the ACP acountable to the Panamanian electorate by requiring a referendum before certain major changes to Canal operations
are undertaken. 1° 3 Under article 325 of the Panamanian
97 See

Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Panamd art. 315 (2004),
http://www.epasa.com/constitucion/ constitucion.pdf.
98
See id. at art. 3 16.

99 See id. at art. 318; see also PANAMA CANAL AUTHORITY, ACP
Over-

view, http://www.pancanal. com/eng/general/acp-overview.htm.
100 See Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Panam, arts. 320-21
(2004).

101 See id. at art. 322
Organic Law of the Panama Canal Authority, Panama National
Assembly Law No. 19, (June 11, 1997),
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/legal/law/law.pdf.
103 See Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Panamd, supra
note 97,
102See

at art. 325.
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Constitution, any proposal for the construction of a third set
of locks or a sea-level canal on the existing route must be
approved by the executive branch and then submitted to the
National Assembly for approval or rejection. 1 4
If
approved, the proposal must be submitted to a popular
referendum no earlier than three months 0 after
the pro5
Assembly.'
National
the
posal's approval by
On April 24, 2006, the ACP's Board of Directors
presented its proposal to Panamanian President Martin
Torrijos for the construction of a third set of locks.' 0 6 A
few months later, President Torrijos and the Cabinet Council of Panama approved the proposal and submitted it to the
National Assembly.1" 7 In July 2006, the National Assembly unanimously endorsed the expansion proposal and,
pursuant to the Panamanian Constitution, passed a law
mandating that a referendum be conducted at least ninety
days after the National Assembly's approval of the proposal. 108

The referendum took place on October 22, 2006,
and nearly eighty percent of the voters supported the proposed Canal expansion. 10 9 On November 1, 2006, Panama's Electoral Tribunal published a resolution
104

See id.

105 See id.
106
107

Proposal for Expansion of the Panama Canal, supra note 9, at 1.
PresidentMartin TorrijosApproves Panama Canal Expansion

Proposaland Submits it to the NationalAssembly, PANAMA CANAL
AUTHORITY, June 27, 2006. http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/
documentos/propuesta/acp-expansion-natl-assembly.pdf.
108 See Panama CanalExpansion Takes Major Step Forward:National
Assembly UnanimouslyApproves Expansion Proposal,Passes Law
MandatingReferendum, PANAMA CANAL AUTHORITY, July 17, 2006,
availableat
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/documentos/propuesta/acpexpansion-referendum.pdf; National Assembly Law No. 28, arts. 1, 78 (July 17, 2006), http://www.pancanal.com/
eng/plan/documentos/referencia/acp-plan-ref-ley-28.pdf.
109 See Lacey, supra note 11.
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announcing the "Si" victory in the referendum and authorizing the ACP to execute the proposal for the construction
of a third set of locks in the Panama Canal. 110 Curiously,
turnouts ever."11
this was one of Panama's lowest voter
Since only about forty percent of eligible voters showed up
of the electorate actually
at the polls, only thirty percent
1 12
expansion.
approved the Canal
The ostensible purpose of a referendum on the construction of the third set of locks is to ensure that the Panamanian people have a say in the management of a resource
that is an important symbol of the Panamanian sovereignty
and an essential source of national revenue. The low voter
turnout raises questions about the ACP's popular mandate
to expand the Canal. Even more disturbing are the allegations of impropriety with respect to how the referendum
was carried out. These concerns are two-fold. First, the
public was not provided with the necessary information to
make an informed decision about the environmental and
socioeconomic impacts of the proposed Canal expansion.
Second, the referendum process was fraught with procedural irregularities designed to favor the proponents of the
Canal expansion and to silence the opposition. These irregularities are discussed in Part II below in the context of
the applicable legal requirements regarding environmental
impact assessment.
II. Environmental Impact Assessment and the Referendum Process
Environmental Impact Assessment (hereinafter
"EIA") is an evaluation of the environmental consequences
of proposed projects, activities and programs in order to
11o See Boletin del Tribunal Electoral, Resoluci6n 387 (Nov. 1, 2006)
(on file with the author).
111See Lacey supra note 11.
112See id.
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integrate environmental protection into development planning. 113 Because a project or activity might also have significant social and economic consequences, social impact
analysis (SIA) is often part of the EIA process.' 14 The
following sections discuss the basic principles of EIA,
examine Panama's EIA legislation, and utilize this information to analyze and critique the procedural irregularities that
marred the referendum process.
A. Environmental Impact Assessment: Origins
and Basic Principles
EIA emerged as a regulatory tool in the early 1970s
with the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in the United States, 1 5 and was subsequently
adopted by both high and low-income countries and by
international aid and financial institutions.16 Currently,
over 150 countries have domestic EIA legislation. 117 EIA
requirements are so pervasive that some would argue that
the duty to assess environmental impacts
has become a
118
law.
international
of
principle
fundamental
The primary objectives of the EIA process are twofold. First, the EIA process is designed to ensure that the
possible impacts of a proposed project are fully identified

113See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND
POLICY 531 (2007).
114 See UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (UNECE), POLICIES AND SYSTEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

21-22 (1991).

115See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4321-46 (2001). The NEPA regulations are set forth at 40 C.F.R. §§
1500.1-1517.7
(1985).
116
See ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES: PRINCIPLES METHODS, AND PRACTICE

Lee & Clive George, eds. 2000).
117 See HUNTERET AL., supra note 113, at 533.
118

See id.
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and analyzed before a decision is made. 1 9 Second, the EIA
process is a tool to inform the public about the proposed
project and to solicit meaningful1 public input on the proj ect's potential costs and benefits. 20
One key aspect of the EIA process is the identification of alternatives to the proposed project. 12 1 In the absence of alternatives,

the

EIA becomes

a post-hoc

122
justification for a decision that has already been made.
Instead of evaluating only one course of action, the EIA
should consider alternative ways of achieving a particular
goal so that the decision-maker may select the alternative
that minimizes environmental, social and economic
costs. 123 As explained in the following sections, Panama's
EIA legislation incorporates some but not all of these established EIA principles.

B. Environmental Impact Assessment:
Panama's Legal Framework
Under the Panamanian Constitution and under the
ACP's Organic Law, the ACP is responsible for the conservation of the Canal's water resources. 124 The ACP must
protect the water resources of the Canal in order to operate
the Canal and to supply drinking water to the communities
" 9 See id. at 531.
120 See id. at 531-34.
121 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 957-63

(1994); WILLIAM A. TILLEMAN, Public Participationin the Environmental Impact Assessment Process:A ComparativeStudy of Impact
Assessment in Canada, the UnitedStates and the EuropeanCommu-

nity, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 384-393 (1995); UNECE,
supra note 114, at 15;WORLD BANK, THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: A REVIEW OF WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE, World Bank

Technical Paper No. 363 at 30-34 (1997).
122 See UNECE, supra note 114, at 15.
123See id.

124 See CONSTITUCION POLOTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA, supra

note 97, art. 316; ORGANIC LAW, supra note 102 , at arts. 120-21.
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surrounding the Canal. 125 These communities comprise
approximately sixty percent of Panama's population and
include the nation's capital, Panama City. 12' The ACP, in

consultation with other government authorities, must protect the environment in the Canal watershed, and must
assess the environmental impact of projects and 1activities
27
that may significantly impact the Canal watershed.
According to the regulations promulgated by the
ACP pursuant to the Organic Law, the ACP is responsible
for reviewing and approving EIAs for its own projects as
well as for projects conducted by third parties in the Canal
watershed; these EIAs must be performed in accordance
with the ACP manual developed for this purpose. 128 However, the ACP's regulations subject projects referenced in
article 325 of the Panamanian Constitution (such as the
construction of a third set of locks) to the EIA requirements
of the National Environmental Authority (Autoridad Nasupra note 102, art. 120.
Presentation by Roy Phillipps, ACP attorney, during meeting with

125See ORGANIC LAW,
126

ACP staff in the ACP office in the former Canal Zone, Dec. 13, 2007
(notes on file with the author); See also, Juan Luis Batista, Panamdy
Col6n: g Una Sola Ciudad?,LA PRENSA, Feb. 7, 2000 (explaining that
approximately half of Panama's population resides in the area surrounding the Panama Canal).
127

See ORGANIC LAW, supra note 102, arts. 121 (1), (5).
No. 116, arts. 5, 7, 14, and 37-42 (July 27, 2006),

128See ACUERDO

http://www.pancanal.com/esp/legal reglamentos/acuerdo 116.pdf. At
the conclusion of a meeting at the ACP's offices in the former Canal
Zone on December 13, 2007, the ACP staff provided the author with a
copy of the Manual Thcnico de Evaluaci6n Ambiental (2006) prepared
by the ACP and with ANAM's Manual Operativo de Evaluaci6n de
Impacto Ambiental (Resoluci6n No. AG-0292-01) (Dec. 9, 2001). The
ACP staff also provided the author with the Environmental Evaluation
Manual (January 1999) prepared for the Panama Canal Commission
(the ACP's predecessor) by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile
District. These EIA manuals do not appear to be available on the ACP
website despite the availability of voluminous background materials on
the Canal as well as the statutes and regulations applicable to the ACP.
See http://www.pancanal.com (last visited on March 3, 2008).
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cional del Ambiente, or ANAM) and to the approval of
both ANAM and the ACP. 129 Because the ACP's own
regulations subject the Panama Canal expansion project to
ANAM's procedural and substantive EIA requirements, it
is useful to examine the source and scope of ANAM's
regulatory authority.
ANAM was created by Law No. 41, the general environmental law for the Republic of Panama, which was
enacted by the National Assembly on July 1, 1998.130 Law
No. 41 grants ANAM the authority to enforce Panama's
environmental laws, regulations, and national environmental policy.' 31 Among ANAM's obligations are the
evaluation of EIAs and the promotion of public participation in the enforcement of environmental legislation and in
the development and implementation
of environmental
132
policies, strategies, and programs.
Law No. 41 requires the preparation of an EIA prior
to the commencement of any activity, work, or project in
Panama that may generate environmental risks, including
projects to be conducted in the Canal watershed, and designates ANAM as the regulatory entity responsible for EIA
review and approval. 133 The EIA evaluation process consists of three steps: the submission of the EIA to ANAM;
the evaluation of the EIA and its approval or rejection by
ANAM; and, if the project is approved, the supervision and
evaluation of the project's execution by the designated
environmental authority. 134 ANAM is responsible for public consultation on the EIA, and must provide a public

129

See id., art. 40.

130See

Ley General de Ambiente de la Repfiblica de PanamAi, No. 41,

art. 5 (July 1, 1998), availableathttp://www/
asamblea.gob.pa/NORMAS/1980/1983_018_0598.PDF.
131See id.
132 See id., at art. 7 (10), (11).
133 See id., at art. 23.
134
See id. at art. 24.
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comment period. 13 5 If the project proponent fails to submit
an EIA or submits an inadequate EIA, ANAM may enjoin
36
the implementation of the project or impose sanctions.'
Pursuant to Law No. 41, ANAM has promulgated regulations detailing
the EIA requirements and has produced an
137
manual.
EIA
The ACP's Organic Law, which was promulgated
one year after Law No. 41, is silent on the relationship
between the authority of ANAM and the ACP with respect
to the approval of Canal-related EIAs. 138 However, the
Organic Law does require the ACP to protect the Canal
'1 39
watershed "in coordination with competent authorities,"
and authorizes the ACP to promulgate EIA regulations
"taking into account the general provisions in force in Panama., 140 Far from displacing ANAM's authority over
Canal-related EIAs, the language of the Organic Law appears to defer to pre-existing environmental legislation.
Notwithstanding the Organic Law's apparent deference to ANAM's regulatory authority under Law No. 41,
the ACP promulgated regulations on July 27, 2006 (five
weeks before the referendum) that make the ACP the sole
arbiter of all EIAs for Canal-related projects except major
construction projects contemplated by article 325 of the
Panamanian Constitution (such as the construction of the
third set of locks). 14 1 Because the ACP did carve out a
See id. at art. 27.
See id. at art. 30.
137
ANAM's EIA regulations are set forth in EXECUTIVE DECREE No.
115

136

209 (Sept. 5, 2006) (on file with the author). ANAM's EIA manual,
which was supplied to the author by the ACP staff, is contained in
RESOLUCI6N No. AG-0292-01 (Dec. 9, 2001) (on file with the author)
availableat

www.asamblea.gob.pa/legispan/PDFNORMAS/2000/2001/2001_303
3913.PDF.
138 See generally, Organic Law, supra note 102.
139 See id., at art. 12 1(1).
140 See id., at art. 121(5).
141 See Acuerdo 116, supra note 128, at arts. 5,7, 40.
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narrow exception for Article 325 projects, there is no ques-

tion that the proposed expansion of the Panama Canal is
and approvals of both the
subject to the EIA14 requirements
2
ANAM.
ACP and
ANAM's EIA manual unequivocally recognizes
that environmental impact assessment is a tool for enhancing and informing decision-making by government agencies and by the public-rather than a post-hoc
143 Simirationalization for previously approved projects.
larly, while the ACP's EIA manual emphasizes the technical rather than policy aspects of environmental impact
assessment, the EIA manual prepared by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers for the Panama Canal Commission (the
ACP's predecessor), which is used as a reference by the
ACP, explains that the fundamental purpose of the EIA
process is to enhance decision-making by government
agencies and by the public by providing information about
the environmental impact of proposed actions.1 44 The
ANAM EIA manual points out that EIAs should be conducted at the earliest possible stage of the contemplated
project or action.' 45 The Panama Canal Commission EIA
manual emphasizes that the methodology utilized should
"bring together the results of all environmental studies
conducted to allow preparation of a single consolidated

document describing the considered action's total im142
143

See id., art. 40; Constituci6n Politica, supra note 97, at art. 325.
See ANAM, Manual Operativo de Evaluaci6n de Impacto Ambien-

tal (RESOLUCION No. AG-0292-01) (Dec. 9, 2001) § 1.1.2, at 10 (on
file with the author).
144
See U.S. ARMY CORPS

TAL ENVIRONMENTAL

OF ENGINEERS (USACE), ENVIRONMENEVALUATION MANUAL at 28 (Jan. 1999) (on file

with the author). ACP attorney Roy Phillipps informed the author that
the USCACE manual has been superseded by the ACP's EIA manual
and is currently used only as a reference. See March 28, 2008 e-mail
correspondence between Roy Phillipps and the author (on file with the

author).

See ANAM, Manual Operativo de Evaluaci6n de Impacto Ambiental, supra note 143, at 4, 10.
145
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pacts." 146 Both the ANAM and Panama Canal Commission
EIA manuals discuss the importance of evaluating alternatives to the proposed action and of analyzing environmental
147
and socioeconomic impacts in an integrated manner.
C. Subversion of the Referendum Process
through Environmental Non-Compliance
In light of the foregoing language in the ANAM
EIA manual and in light of Law No. 41 's prohibition on the
commencement of projects or activities in the absence of an
EIA, one would expect that a comprehensive EIA on a
project as significant as the Panama Canal expansion would
be completed and submitted for public comment and for
ANAM and ACP approval prior to a national referendum.
In the absence of a completed EIA, it would be difficult for
Panamanian voters to fully assess the costs and benefits of
the proposed Canal expansion.
Regrettably, the referendum took place before an
EIA for the Canal expansion was produced and in the face
of conflicting claims about the authority of ANAM to review and approve EIAs for Canal-related projects. The
comprehensive Environmental Impact Study for the construction of the third set of locks was not completed until
July of 2007 (nine months after the referendum), 148 and was
not approved by ANAM until November of that same
year. 149 While the ACP prepared several environmental
146

28.
147

See USACE, Environmental Evaluation Manual, supra note 144, at
See id. at 3-4, 190-97; ANAM, Manual Operativo de Evaluaci6n de

Impacto Ambiental, supra note 143, at 4.
148 See Panama Canal Authority, Environmental Impact Study (EIS) for
the Panama Canal Project-Third Set of Locks (2007),
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/expansion/eisa/index.html.
149
See Panama Canal Authority,
http://www.pancanal.com/esp/ampliacion/eisa/ (last visited March 2,
2008) (listing the EIAs prepared by ACP and the dates of ANAM
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and socioeconomic impact evaluations prior to the referenfora,'5 °
dum and presented these to the public in various
these piecemeal assessments fell short of the comprehensive study recommended by the Panama Canal Commission
EIA manual, and were not reviewed and approved by
ANAM. 151
In the weeks preceding the referendum, Panamanian citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
began to criticize the "Si" campaign (the government's
campaign in favor of the Canal expansion) for proposing to
expand the Panama Canal without first having performed
an EIA and for side-stepping ANAM's regulatory authorIn response, ANAM director Ligia Castro de Doens
ity.1
announced that a review of an EIA by ANAM would only
be necessary if the ballot proposal was approved. 53 Furthermore, the ACP declared that, pursuant to the ACP's
rule making power under the 1999 Organic Law, "to deapproval and explaining that ANAM approved the Environmental
Impact Study for the Third Set of Locks on November 9, 2007 pursuant
to Resoluci6n DIEORA 632-2007). It appears that the constructionrelated ElAs produced by the ACP after the referendum were all apVroved
by ANAM.
0 Presentation by Hortensia Broce, ACP official, during meeting with
ACP staff in the ACP office in the former Canal Zone, Dec. 13 ,2007
(notes on file with the author).
151See Panama Canal Authority, Estudios Complementarios,
http://www.pancanal.com/esp/ampliacion/
esia/complementarios/index.html (providing links to these earlier
studies); Manuel Zdrate, El Canal,El Ambiente y el Proyecto de Ampliaci6n, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec. 2006), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl 24
/04zarate.pdf (discussing the inadequacy of the fragmented environmental studies).
152 See Eric Jackson, supra note 12; Asociaci6n EcologistaPanamefay
Asociaci6n de DerechoAmbiental, En peligro la vida y el ambiente de
los panamefios, 124 TAREAS (Sept-Dec. 2006), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl24
/1Oguevara.pdf.
153See Jackson, supra note 12.
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velop projects in the area that can affect the environment
[and] to approve environmental impact studies that are
required for authority projects . . . are functions of the

[ACP] administrator."' 154 In other words, the ACP took the
position that ANAM's review of EIAs, as required by Law
No. 41, did not apply to the ACP, and that if the referendum passed, the ACP would be authorized to approve its
own EIA. 155
The positions taken by ANAM and by the ACP in
connection with the EIA for the Canal expansion generated
controversy in Panama. Former ANAM director Gonzalo
Mendndez argued that the Organic Law did not give the
ACP the power to usurp Panama's environmental legislation. 156 Mr. Mendndez alleged that the ACP "attempt[s]
with unnatural and absurd legalisms to make us believe that
there is no conflict of interest if the ACP does an environ57
mental impact study and the same ACP approves it." 1
In short, the referendum process was abused. The
Panamanian electorate was asked to approve an extremely
expensive and controversial project in the absence of comprehensive information about the potential environmental
and socioeconomic impacts and on the basis of piecemeal
ACP studies that were not reviewed and approved in advance by ANAM.
D. Manipulation of the Referendum Process to
Suppress the "No" Vote
In addition to the absence of a comprehensive EIA
for the proposed Canal expansion project, the referendum
was marred by procedural irregularities designed to favor
the "Si" campaign and silence the opposition.

156

See id.
See id.
See id.

157

See id.

154
155
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First, the government's handling of the proposed
Canal expansion lacked transparency. According to former
Canal administrator Fernando Manfredo, the Panamanian
public was kept in the dark during the nearly ten years that
the ACP developed its studies and proposals regarding the
future of the Canal.158 By contrast, other interested parties,
including shipping companies, the international community, the Panamanian construction industry, and the Panamanian association of15 9engineers and architects, were
consulted and informed.
When the Canal expansion proposal finally saw the
light of day, the public was given only a few months to
read, digest and analyze 55,000 pages of studies and supporting documents far too technical for the average lay
person to understand. 160 To add insult to injury, the ACP's
studies were initially available only in English. 16 1 As Professor Miguel Antonio Bernal from the University of Panama pointed out, English is not the official language of
Panama. 162 Professor Bernal condemned the ACP for placing the burden on Panamanian citizens to translate the
ACP's studies into Spanish.'63
Second, the government was accused of using public funds to promote the "Si" campaign by taking over the
airwaves and saturating radio and television broadcasts
with pro-expansion propaganda. 164 Much of this propa158

See Fernando Manfredo, Canal de Panamd: El Proyecto del Tercer

Juego de Esclusas, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec. 2006), availableat
htttp://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl2
4/02 manfredo.pdf.
159 See id.

160 See id.; NotiCen, supra note
12.
161Miguel Antonio Bemal, The Right

to Information, The Panama
News, May 7-20, 2006, Vol. 12, Num. 9 at
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v 12/issue 09/opinion 02.html.
162See id.
163See id.
164 See NotiCen, supra note 12.
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ganda was intended to manipulate nationalist sentiment.1 65
For example, on April 25, 2006, in an event marked by
patriotic pomp and circumstance, President Torrijos endorsed the ACP's proposal and proclaimed that the Canal
expansion would elevate Panama to the status of a First
World nation.' 66 The ceremony concluded with all of the
participants standing and proudly singing the national anthem. 16 7 As if to discourage the public from reading the
55,000 pages of Canal-related documents, the ACP deputized sixty functionaries to explain in simple terms all of
the Canal expansion's benefits.1 68 The ACP reportedly
hired a global public relations firm to disparage antiexpansion research projects and marginalize the grassroots
"No" campaign. 169 According to the Frente Nacional por la
Defensa de los Derechos Econ6micos y Sociales
(FRENADESO), an umbrella organization of groups opposed to the Canal expansion,17the
cost of the "Si" campaign
0
was a staggering $1.8 billion.
Third, the government allegedly used public funds
to purchase votes from vulnerable segments of the population. President Torrijos purportedly gave indigent families
a bi-monthly payment of $35 and informed them that this
assistance could only be sustained in the future if the "Si"
vote were to prevail. 17 1 Similarly, President Torrijos raised
eyebrows when he gave every representative of the country's corregimientos (the smallest level of local govern165
166
167
168

See Manfredo, supra note 158.

See id.
See id.
See id.

169

See Danielle Ryan, PR PushingThrough the PanamaCanal Expansion, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Oct. 20, 2006,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0610/S00338.html.
170 See NotiCen, supra note 12.
171 See Eric

Jackson, On the Campaign Trailfor the Canal Expansion

Referendum, The Panama News, June 4-17, 2006, Vol. 12, Num. 11,
http://www.thepanamanews.co/pn/v_ 12/issue_ 11/ business_02.html.
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ment) $80,000 for social projects in the midst of the proexpansion campaign.172
Fourth, the media collaborated with the "Si" campaign by suppressing reports unfavorable to the expansion
project during the referendum. For example, newspaper
columnist Maribel Cuervo de Paredes alleged that she was
fired from La Prensa (a major Panamanian newspaper)
after 15 years of service for writing against the Canal expansion. 173 According to Cuervo de Paredes,
[t]he media have suppressed all the points
and arguments of the proponents of the
"No" [campaign]. And the reason is very
simple. The owners of the media in Panama
are owners of important businesses or form
part of the law firms that litigate or provide
services to the shipping companies or who
[sic] represent firms or companies that proto the ACP.
vide services or sell 1products
74
It's a matter of money.
When the Catholic Church demanded a fair debate
over the proposed expansion project, La Prensa gave twice
as much coverage to expansion proponents than to the
Catholic bishops and no coverage to the views of the expansion opponents.1 75 In some instances, newspaper reporters were, themselves, compromised by association with
172

See NotiCen, supra note 12.

173

See id. Cuervo de Paredes claims that she was informed by her

publisher that her column would be cancelled because her views were
supposedly not "objective." See Ashley Dalman, Expanding the Panama Canal: A Wider Canalor More GovernmentalPayola? Council
on Hemispheric Affairs, Aug. 8, 2006,
http://www.coha.org/2006/08/08/expanding-the-panama-canal-a-widercanal-or-more-government-payola/.
174

175

See NotiCen, supra note 12.
See Dalman, supra note 173.
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the "Si" campaign. For example, the president of the Colegio de Periodistas (the journalists' trade association) was
that
the owner of the firm hired by the civic associations
76
1
referendum.
the
in
campaign
supported the "Si"
Sixth, opponents of the Canal expansion were allegedly arrested, beaten, or otherwise intimidated in order to
suppress the "No" vote. For example, anti-expansion campaigners were reportedly arrested in Chiriqui and in Panama City; subjected to detention and physical abuse in
Cocl&, Santiago de Veraguas, and Arraijdn; and maimed in
Chitr6 for passing out "No" campaign literature. 177 There
is also evidence that employees of Constructora Urbana
S.A. (CUSA), a construction company owned by ACP
administrator Alberto Alemdn Zubieta, were paid to become members of the pro-expansion "Obreros de la Construcci6n por el Si, "an ad hoc organization created to give
the impression that workers supported the Canal expansion.
Finally, the voting process itself was full of irregularities. On the day of the referendum, former Panamanian
President Guillermo Endara, who dressed in red from head
to toe to show his opposition to the expansion, complained
that polling place workers wore "Si" clothing and handed
out cards with directions on where and how to vote-with
the "Si" campaign printed on the
propaganda supporting
79
side.'
opposite
E. Why the Canal Expansion Was Controversial
The subversion of the referendum process is unfortunate because the Canal expansion proposal was contro176

See NotiCen, supra note 12.

177 id.
178
179

See id.
PanaGal, Expansion ofPanama Canal isApproved, Sept. 4, 2007,

http://www.panamaexpertos.com/expansion-of-panama-canal-isapproved.
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versial and merited thoughtful public debate and analysis.
While this article will not attempt to resolve the substantive
controversy over the Canal expansion project, this section
discusses the concerns expressed by the expansion project's
critics in order to highlight the numerous environmental
and socioeconomic impacts that should have been analyzed
in painstaking detail in a comprehensive EIA prior to the
referendum.
1. Environmental Concerns
The major environmental concerns voiced by the
opponents of the Panama Canal expansion include salinization of the drinking water supply, the potential migration of
species between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and deforestation.
At first glance, the proposed expansion project appears to be environmentally benign. All of the construction
will take place in areas that were previously dredged, filled,
and deforested during the initial Canal construction and
during the aborted effort in the 1930s to begin work on a
third set of locks.' 80 The project will recycle sixty percent
of the water it uses, which means that the new locks will
18 1
use seven percent less water than the old locks.
However, on closer inspection, studies performed
by the ACP's own environmental consultants raise serious
questions about the possible salinization of the drinking
water upon which the Panama City metropolitan area relies. i8 2 Miraflores, Gatin, and Alajuela are the three
freshwater lakes used to fill the Canal's locks and to supply
180See Panama

Canal Authority, Proposalforthe Expansion of the

Panama Canal,supra note 9, at 14, 24.
"' See id. at 46-47; Matalon, supra note 85.
182 See Ariel Rodriguez Vargas, Impacto
de la Ampliaci6n en Los
Lagos Gatzin y Miraflores, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec. 2006), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/
tarl24/09vargas.pdf.
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drinking water to the neighboring population.1 83 The environmental studies commissioned by the ACP suggest that
the salinization of these lakes is already taking place and
that the water recycling operations of the new locks will
184
likely accelerate the intrusion of saltwater into the lakes.
In addition, underwater blasting and dredging associated
with the construction project may contaminate the water
supply. 185 According to the project's critics, the public
documents prepared by the ACP prior to the referendum
are misleading because they reassure the public that water
quality will not be impaired by the construction of a third
set of locks and
do not address the considerable evidence to
86
the contrary.
A second concern articulated by environmentalists
is that the new locks will facilitate the passage of species
from one ocean to the other, potentially damaging Caribbean coral reefs and other ecosystems. 87 As Greenpeace
observes, "[t]he creation of artificial corridors that allow
migration of species from previously separate habitats is of
great concern because it is highly likely to have unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences on the finely balanced web of life in each habitat."'1 88 Scientists have
identified a number of exotic species transported into the
See id.
See id.; Jackson, supra note 12.
185See Matthew Parker, Changing Course, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28,
183
184

2007).
186 See Rodriguez Vargas, supra note 182; Jackson, supra note 12. For
example, the ACP's Proposalforthe Expansion of the Panama Canal
states that "[e]ven when operating at maximum capacity, the third set
of locks, equipped with water reutilization basins, will not affect the
water quality of Gatfin and Alajuela lakes or that of their tributaries.
These lakes will keep their tropical fresh water quality with stable
ecosystems, and the water will be kept to well within appropriate quality levels and standards in order that they can be made potable and used
by the population." Panama Canal Authority, supra note 9, at 51.
187 See NotiCen, supra note 12.

188 See Parker, supra note 185.
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waters of the Canal during the Canal's initial construction

and subsequent operation, but there is a dearth of research
1 89
on the effects of these species upon native ecosystems.
Finally, the construction of a third set of locks will
result in the fragmentation and destruction of approximately 490 hectares of forests. 190 The deforestation is
anticipated to produce ecosystem disruptions and loss of
biological diversity. 191 Among the forests potentially affected are the mangrove forests currently providing important ecosystem services in the form of flood control by
absorbing billions of liters of water in their complex root
systems. 192 The destruction of these forests may increase
the risk of urban flooding 93during the rainy season, particularly in the city of Col6n.1
2. Socioeconomic Concerns
The socioeconomic concerns articulated by the
project's critics are complex and voluminous and are discussed only briefly below.
First, critics of the Canal expansion dispute the
ACP's claim that the expansion is needed in order to maintain the Canal's competitiveness, question the economic
feasibility of the project, and assert that project costs will
exceed project revenues. 194 Numerous commentators have
observed that the ACP's $5.25 billion cost estimate is
grossly understated and that the real cost of the Canal ex-

See Andrea Gawrylewski, OpeningPandora'sLocks, 21 THE SCIENTIST 47, 52-53, Oct. 1, 2007.
190
See Fernando Manfredo, Canal de Panamiy Medio Ambiente, 126
TAREAS 103, 103-06 (May-Aug. 2007).
189

191

See id.

192 See Gawrylewski, supra note 189, at 47-48.
193See id.
194
See M6ndez, supra note 92.
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pansion is likely to exceed $10 billion. 195 Project critics
dispute the ACP's assertion that these costs can be recovered through toll increases without undermining the competitiveness of the Panama Canal vis-d-vis alternative
routes. 196 These critics point out that the ACP's ability to
increase tolls is constrained by competition from the Suez
Canal and from the U.S. overland route. 197 Furthermore, if
global warming opens up an Arctic route (the coveted
Northwest passage)-a much shorter path than the Panama
Canal for trade between Europe and Asia and between the
U.S. East Coast and Asia-then the Panama Canal may
198
have to reduce tolls in order to remain competitive.
195 See id.; Luxner, supra note 82; Tomdis Drohan Ruiz, El Verdadero
Costo de la Ampliaci6n del Canalde Panamd, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec.
2006), availableat http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/ panama/cela/ tareas/tar124/05ruiz.pdf.
196 See Roberto N. M~ndez, ViabilidadFinancierade un Tercer Juego
de Esclusas, 126 TAREAS 89, 95-96 (May-Aug. 2007); Fernando Manfredo, Los Estudios Sobre la Ampliaci6n del Canal de Panamd, 123
TAREAS (May-Aug. 2006), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/ tareas/tarl23/04 manfredo.pdf.
197 See Manfredo, supra note 158.
198 See id.; Corbin, supra note 87; Scott Borgerson, The Scramblefor
the Arctic, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63, 68-71 (2008). As a consequence

of global warming, the Arctic ice cap has been melting at a far more
rapid rate than had been projected by almost all of the computergenerated simulations. See Andrew C. Revkin, The Arctic 's Alarming
Sea Change: DwindlingIce Cap Concerns Scientists But Heartens
Traders, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 3, 2007, at 5. The thinning of

the Arctic ice cap increases the feasibility of the Northwest Passage as
a shorter route than the Panama Canal between the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans - both during the summer months (for normal ships) and yearround (for ships equipped with ice breakers). See Robert Wade, A
Warmer Arctic Needs Shipping Rules, FINANCIAL TIMES (Asia Edition),

Jan. 16, 2008, at 11; Saran Somanthan, Peter C. Flynn & Jozef K.
Szymanski, Feasibilityof a Sea Route Through the CanadianArctic, 9
MARITIME ECONOMICS AND LOGISTICS 324 (2007). Some experts
believe that a tipping point has already been reached and that increasingly faster melting will make the Northwest Passage a viable altema-
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These critics also question the ACP's assertion that the
Canal will shortly reach maximum capacity, and cite numerous studies predicting a far lower annual increase in
trade volumes than projected by the ACP. 199 In short, the
project opponents argue that the Canal expansion is of
dubious economic value and that the government's limited
should be invested in more worthwhile undertakresources
200
ings.
Second, project critics caution that the Canal expansion may impose serious financial burdens on Panama.20 1
If the expansion project's costs cannot be recovered
through toll increases and through increased trade volumes,
20 2
Panamanian taxpayers may wind up footing the bill.
Although the ACP claims that the expansion project is selffinancing, the ACP acknowledges that it will have to obtain
an additional $500 million per year in the financial markets
in order to cover expansion project requirements. 20 3 The
ACP asserts that the Panamanian government will not have
to endorse or guarantee these loans because the Panamanian Constitution makes the ACP financially independent
from the rest of the government. 204 Project critics point out
that it is unclear whether lenders will provide loans to the
ACP without an explicit guarantee from the Panamanian
government. 205 If a government guarantee is required, then
the Canal expansion could double the national debt and
reduce the government's ability to promote economic development and provide for the basic needs of the popula-

tive route for much of the year as early as 2015 -even for ships that are
not equipped with icebreakers. See Wade, supra note 198, at 11.
199
See M~ndez, supra note 92.
200 See M~ndez, supra note 196, at 100.
201 See Manfredo, supra note 158, at 15.
202 See id.
203 See Panama Canal Authority, supra note 9, at 61-62.
204 See id. at 63-64.
205 See Manfredo, supra note 158.
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tion.206 Moreover, the ACP's investment of Canal revenues
in the expansion project represents a diversion of funds that
could have7 been earmarked for more socially productive
20
purposes.
Third, project opponents dispute the ACP's claims
that the expansion project will generate jobs and other
economic benefits for Panama.2 °8 They point out that the
estimated 7,000 new jobs generated during the peak construction period are temporary jobs of a relatively short
duration 20 9 and few Panamanians are qualified for these
highly skilled positions. 2 10 While the ACP claims that
public and private entities will institute training programs
to ensure that the labor force is primarily Panamanian, the
project's critics question how such training programs will
be financed. 211 The project opponents reject as completely
unsubstantiated the ACP's claim that the Canal expansion
will produce an economic boom in Panama that will generate over 200,000 additional jobs in the long run.2 12 These
critics maintain that only a small fraction of the funds invested in the Canal expansion will remain in Panama, and
that most of the money will be used to hire foreign contractors and consultants and to import equipment, technology
and materials.213
See id.; Manfredo, supra note 196.
See Manfredo, supra note 158.
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 See Corbin, supra note
87.
211 See Panama Canal Authority, Proposal for the Expansion of the
206
207

Panama Canal, supra note 9, at 67-68 (discussing the training programs); Manfredo, Canal de Panamd: El Proyecto, supra note 158
(questioning how the training programs will be financed).
2 See Manfredo, supra note 158.
213 See Jorge E. Illueca et al., Algunos Mitos En Torno a la Amplicacidn
del Canal, 124 TAREAS, Sept.-Dec. 2006, availableat
htttp://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl 2
4/ 08illueca.pdf; Manfredo, Los Estudios Sobre la Ampliacirn, supra
note 196.
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Fourth, the project critics highlight the potentially
negative impact of the Canal expansion on the Panama City
metropolitan area. They assert that the Canal expansion
project will enlarge the population of the metropolitan
region, as rural migrants and foreign workers converge on
the area in search of Canal-related employment. 2 14 Because the vast majority of migrants will not find jobs, this
migration will increase urban poverty and unemployment,
swell the ranks of those working in the informal sector,
strain public services (including the police and the judiciary), place additional demands on the urban housing stock,
and generate additional shanty towns.215
Fifth, project critics contend that the real beneficiaries of the Canal expansion will be the friends and relatives
of government officials who will profit handsomely from
Canal-related contracts.2 16 These critics point out that ACP

directors and administrators have blatant conflicts of interests because they own shares or have other commercial ties
with the construction companies, banks, and law firms that
stand to gain from this project. 217 These concerns were
reinforced when the first company awarded a construction
contract proved to be closely associated with the current
ACP administrator. 218 On July 6, 2007, the ACP announced that Constructora Urbana S.A. (CUSA), which is
owned by the family of ACP administrator Alberto Alemdn
Zubieta, had been awarded the contract for the excavation
2 19
of the Pacific entrance for the new set of locks.
Sixth, the project opponents maintain that the billions of dollars allocated for the Canal expansion should
See Manfredo, supra note 158.
id.
216 See Mrndez, Por Qu6 PanamdDebe Decir "No, " supra
note 92;
Doubts Over Transparencyof Canal Tender, Caribbean and Central
American Report, July 19, 2007.
217 See Mrndez, Por Qu6Panamd Debe Decir "No, "supra note 92.
218 See Caribbean and Central American Report, supra note 216.
219 See id.
214

215 See
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instead be directed toward health, education, transportation
and other national priorities. 220 These critics point out that
Panama currently has one of the most unequal distributions
of wealth in Latin America. 2 2 According to the World
Bank, nearly forty percent of Panama's population lives in
poverty. 222 While the wealthiest 20 percent of the population receives 60.3 percent of the country's
22 3 wealth, the
percent.23
2.5
only
receives
percent
20
poorest
Finally, several critics of the Canal expansion project have emphasized the need to integrate the Panama
Canal into the country's development strategy, rather than
dealing with it as a separable entity. 2 24 These critics point
out that it is necessary to develop a national development
plan that will utilize the Canal to stimulate other sectors of
the economy, 225 and that will include a strong social justice
component designed to strengthen the provision of essential
services, such as health, education, transportation, housing,
and environmental protection.'
E. The Post-Referendum Environmental Impact
Assessment
Nine months after the referendum, the ACP prepared a comprehensive EIA for the Canal expansion project
that encompassed both environmental and socioeconomic
impacts.227 Critics of the project lambasted the EIA for
220

See Mendez, supra note 92.
See Zfirate, supranote 151.
22 See World Bank, Interim Strategy Note For The Republic Of Panama FY2006-2007, Report No. 32887-PA (Aug. 30, 2005) at 7.
I-,
See World Bank, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2006,
Table
2.8 (2006), availableat
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Table2 8.htm2-1 See Gandisegui, supra note 1; supra note 92; Zdrate, supra note
151.
"' See Gandisegui, supra note 1.
6See M~ndez, supra note 92.
221

27 See Panama Canal Authority, supra note 148.
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failing to fully address one of the most devastating potential consequences of the project: the salinization of the
2 28
water supply of the Panama City metropolitan area.
Nevertheless, the EIA was approved by ANAM on November 9, 2007.229 While a substantive analysis of the
environmental and socioeconomic concerns addressed in
the EIA is beyond the scope of this paper, one significant
procedural defect must be noted.
Contrary to the EIA principles discussed in Part II
(A), the EIA did not analyze alternatives to the proposed
Canal expansion, 230 presumably because the outcome of the
referendum rendered such an analysis moot. It has long
been recognized that the analysis of alternatives is at the
very heart of the EIA process.231 This analysis compares
several means of achieving the project objective (including
the option of not proceeding at all-the no action alternative) so as to enable the decision-maker to select the most

228

See Ariel R. Rodriguez Vargas, Intrusi6n Salina en el Canal de

Panamd,BURICA PRESS, Sept. 24, 2007, availableat burica.wordpress.com/2007/09/24/intrusion-salina-en-el-canal-de-panama/
(translating the conclusions of the leading scientific studies regarding
salinization and making policy recommendations); Ariel R. Rodriguez
Vargas, CuestionanEIA y ForoP~blico de la ACP Sobre Ampliaci6n,
BURICA PRESS, Sept. 8, 2007, availableat burica.wordpress.com/2007/09/08/cuestionan-eia-y-foro-publico-de-la-acpsobre-ampliacion/; Ariel R. Rodriguez Vargas, Estudio de Impacto
Ambiental de la Ampliaci6n del Canalde Panamd vs CalidadyCantidad de Agua Dulce de Los Lagos, BURICA PRESS, Aug. 28, 2007,
availableat burica.wordpress.com/2007/08/28/ampliacion-del-canal_
de-panama-vs-calidad-y-cantidad-de-agua-dulce/.
229 See Panama Canal Authority,
http://www.pancanal.com/esp/ampliacion/eisa/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2008) (explaining that ANAM approved the Environmental Impact
Study for the Third Locks on Nov. 2, 2007, pursuant to Resoluci6n
DIERO 632-2007).
230 See Panama Canal Authority, supra note
148.
231 See Tilleman, supra note 121, at 384-93;RODGERS, supra note 121,
at 957-63, UNECE, supra note 114, at 15.
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promising alternative. 232 Under ordinary circumstances,
one would expect the EIA for the Canal expansion project
to compare the costs and benefits of the proposed action
with several alternatives, including the no action alternative-the option of not proceeding at all.2 33
Regrettably, the subversion of the EIA process and
the subversion of the referendum process proved to be
mutually reinforcing. In other words, the ACP's failure to
prepare a comprehensive EIA prior to the referendum impoverished the public debate over the proposed Canal expansion and arguably facilitated the victory of the "Si"
campaign. The victory of the "Si" campaign, in turn, impoverished the EIA process by excluding alternatives to the
contemplated action from ANAM and ACP's consideration. As a result, the EIA process was reduced to an empty
ritual, a technical justification for a decision made at the
highest levels of government and subsequently "approved"
in a "democratic" referendum rather than a tool to inform
and enhance public and governmental decision-making
over Panama's single most important resource.

See UNECE, supra note 114, at 15.
See Tilleman, supra note 121, at 384-93; Rodgers, supra note 121,
at 957-63, UNECE, supra note 114, at 15. Under U.S. law, for example, the regulations promulgated pursuant to NEPA specify how the
analysis of alternatives is to be conducted and provide criteria for the
analysis of the no-action alternative. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1978)
(outlining the requirements for the analysis of alternatives, including
the no-action alternative); 40 C.F.R. § 6.203 (2007) (providing additional guidance on the preparation and evaluation of the no- action
alternative). Consistent with U.S. and international EIA practice, the
EIA manual prepared for the Panama Canal Commission (the ACP's
predecessor) explicitly required the analysis of the no-action scenario
and the development and analysis of alternatives to the proposed action.
See USACE, supra note 144, at 2-4.
232
233
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Il. Reflections on the Colonial Legacy
While the Canal expansion project is currently in the
construction phase, the case study nevertheless holds valuable lessons for Panama and for other post-colonial societies blessed (or cursed) with valuable natural resources.
Wittingly or unwittingly, colonial institutions and practices
persist long after the departure of the colonial power and
distort economic development and governmental decisionmaking. This section identifies specific aspects of the colonial legacy that continue to affect the operation of the
Canal and concludes with several suggestions designed to
mitigate the colonial legacy by enhancing public participation in the development planning process.
A. The Economic Enclave Problem
The Panama Canal historically functioned as an
economic enclave analogous in some respects to the oil,
mining, and agricultural enclaves operated by transnational
corporations throughout the Americas. 234 Enclaves, by
definition, extract wealth from a particular sector of the
economy without developing significant linkages to other
sectors and without incorporating large segments of the
domestic labor force. 235 Just as countries dependent on
234 See

Zrate, supra note 151; Castro, supra note 5, at 208; Julio Yao,

Es el CanalPatrimonioInalienablede la Naci6n o Propiedadde la
ACP? 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec. 2006), available at
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl 24
/03yao.pdf. The Canal Zone differed from traditional economic enclaves in two important respects. First, the Canal Zone was operated
directly by the U.S. government rather than by private capital. Second,
instead of exploiting the local labor force, the Canal Zone applied U.S.
labor standards and paid salaries much higher than prevailing local
wages. See Castro at 208.
235 See Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Introduction: What is the Problem with NaturalResource Wealth?
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natural resource extraction derive a substantial portion of
national revenues from extractive industries, Panama, after
the transfer of the Canal, would also derive a significant
share of its national income from the operation of the Canal.236 The Panama Canal is currently Panama's single
largest generator of foreign capital but does not represent a
major source of employment for Panama's largely unskilled workforce 2 37 and does not represent
an integral part
238
of a multi-sector development strategy.
As the literature on enclave economies points out,
countries that specialize in natural resource exploitation
often perform worse economically than countries with
fewer resources.2 39 One of the reasons for this poor economic performance is failure to invest in other economic
sectors or in the human capital necessary to develop other
areas of the economy. 240 Education, for example, is frequently neglected because the production of current income
does not
require a highly diversified and skilled work24 1
force.
One lesson for Panama from the experience of
more traditional enclave economies is the importance of
integrating the Canal into the government's long-term development planning. As several Panamanian observers
have noted, the ACP currently operates as a "parallel republic" whose primary mission is the efficient administraESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 4 (Macartan Humphreys et al., eds.
2007).
236 The Canal currently accounts for approximately 20 percent of
Panama's gross domestic product and a significant share of the country's national budget. See Andrew Beatty, PanamaCanalAuthority
Sees Revenue Growth in 2008, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2008), availableat
http://www.reuters.com/ (search "Andrew Beatty revenue growth
2008.")
237 See Corbin, supra note 87.
238 See Zirate, supra note 151;
Yao, supra note 234.
239 See Humphreys, supra note 235, at 1.
24 0
See id. at 10, 12.
241

See id. at 10.
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tion of the Canal.24 2 In order to relieve poverty, generate
employment, and develop other sectors of the economy, it
is essential to integrate the operation of the Canal into a
multi-faceted development strategy designed to diversify
Panama's economic base and to provide jobs, housing,
education, and basic social services.
B. Corruption and Lack of Government Accountability
A second feature of natural resource enclaves is corruption and lack of government accountability. Enclave
economies are frequently characterized by high levels of
corruption because those who control the country's wealth243
producing assets can use this wealth to remain in office.
Enclave economies also tend to have weak, unaccountable
governments because they rely on external income sources
to fill the national coffers and are relatively less dependent
on the good will of taxpayers. 244 Indeed, citizens often
become politically passive and do not monitor government
expenditures or actively participate in government decision-making.245
As explained in Part I (C), the Panamanian Constitution attempts to address the problem of corruption by
insulating the ACP from partisan political pressure. The
Constitution makes the ACP an autonomous legal entity
whose budget is separate from the national budget, whose
directors are appointed to staggered terms, and whose employees are civil servants selected on the basis of meritbased criteria.
242 See Mndez, supra note 92; Yao, supra note 234.
243 See Mndez, supra note 92; Yao, supra note 234.
244
245

See id. at 11-12.
See Terry Lynn Karl, Ensuring Fairness:The Casefor
a Transpar-

ent FiscalSocial Contract,ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE, at 264-

65.
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Despite these laudable efforts to minimize corruption, the absence of legislation prohibiting ACP employees
from awarding Canal-related contracts to businesses in
which they or their families hold a financial stake 2 46 creates
the impression of self-dealing. It may also enable government officials and their families to benefit economically
from the Canal expansion project while imposing the costs
on the Panamanian public. Adoption of conflict of interest
legislation (or, alternatively, ACP conflict of interest regulations) should be a priority as the Canal expansion project
proceeds.
Furthermore, government accountability requires
transparency and public participation in the decisionmaking process. In theory, Article 325 of the Panamanian
Constitution promotes government accountability by requiring a referendum on any proposal for the construction
of a third set of locks or a sea-level canal on the existing
route. However, this provision covers only major changes
to the Canal's operations and is insufficient even for this
narrow range of activities in the absence of additional provisions protecting the integrity of the decision-making
process.
In order to secure meaningful public input on major
changes to the Canal's operations, it is essential to promulgate legislation mandating a pre-referendumn comprehensive EIA. As Part II of this article makes clear, one of the
fundamental problems with the Canal expansion project
referendum was the absence of a comprehensive assessment of the project's environmental and socioeconomic
impacts before the national plebiscite despite the seriousness of the concerns raised by the project's opponents.
Regrettably, the preparation of a comprehensive EIA prior

246 See CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN REPORT,

supra note 216

(explaining that -in Panama there are no restrictions for companies
owned by relatives of top officials gaining public contracts, including
canal extension contracts Nvith ACP.")

HeinOnline -- 4 Tenn. J. L. & Pol'y 347 2008

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 348

to the referendum was not expressly mandated by the Constitution, by the legislation calling for the referendum, by
the ACP's Organic Law, or by the ACP's regulations.
While the failure to prepare a comprehensive EIA prior to
the referendum was inconsistent with the spirit if not the
letter of Law No. 41 and of ANAM's EIA manual,247
ANAM's director took the position that an EIA would not
be required unless the "Si" campaign prevailed.248 One of
the lessons of this debacle is that any legislation calling for
a popular referendum on a project of national significance
must expressly require the preparation of a comprehensive
EIA well in advance of the referendum.
Moreover, in order to enhance the quality of government decision-making on all Canal-related projects, it is
essential that the ACP's environmental determinations be
overseen by ANAM. The ACP's EIA regulations for nonArticle 325 projects erode government accountability by
making the ACP the final arbiter of all Canal-related EIAs
including projects undertaken by the ACP.24 9 This arrangement is problematic because it places the ACP in the
position of both promoter and regulator of ACP projects
that may have significant impacts on the Canal watershed.
In order to avoid actual or apparent conflicts of interest and
in order to benefit from the environmental expertise of
ANAM, the ACP should modify its regulations to require
ANAM approval of EIAs for all Canal-related projects
undertaken by the ACP and its consultants or contractors,
whether or not these projects rise to the level of Article 325
projects.
Finally, the referendum and the post-hoc EIA for
the Canal expansion project exposed deeper problems with
the EIA process in Panama that diminish transparency and
accountability. Because these problems are inextricably
247 See
248

249

supra notes 137, 143-45, and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
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intertwined with the issue of public participation and democratic decision-making, they are discussed in the final
section of this article.
C. The Civilizing Mission and Authoritarian Political Culture
The Canal divided Panama into two distinct nations:
the prosperous, efficiently managed U.S.-dominated Canal
Zone and the poverty-stricken, "underdeveloped" Panamanian state ruled by the Panamanian oligarchy. 250 U.S. officials and the U.S. media justified the U.S. colonial presence
in Panama by depicting the Canal Zone as an oasis of civilization amidst the "torrid, uncontrolled life of the tropics"
and by constructing Panamanians, Colombians, West Indians and indigenous peoples as "natives" incapable of democratic self-government. 251 Sadly, this colonial construct
would be internalized by Panamanians and would reinforce
both the racism and the authoritarianism of the Panamanian
oligarchy, 25
which
perceived the Canal Zone as a model of
2
efficiency.

This emphasis on efficiency at the expense of other
values (such as democracy) is a vestige of the colonial
experience that is evident in some of the ACP's publications. For example, the ACP's EIA manual (the Manual
T6cnico de Evaluaci6n Ambiental) is concise and narrowly
technocratic (as its name implies), with no discussion of the
underlying policies, principles, and objectives of environmental impact assessment.25 3 The ACP's 2003 Social and
Environmental Report is replete with references to the
250

See Castro, supra note 234, at 208-09; Zirate, supra note 151;
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supra note 2, at 84, 101-05, 118-119; OVIDlO DIAz EsPINo,

How WALL

STREET CREATED A NATION: J.P. MORGAN, TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE PANAMA CANAL 197 (2001).
251 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 3-6.
252 See Castro, supra note 234, at 209-10.
253 See ACP, supra note 128.
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"efficiency" and "productivity" and emphasizes

technocratic environmental objectives (such as energy,
efficiency, best practices in reuse and recycling, and best
standards to handle hazardous substances) in lieu of process-oriented objectives such as public participation in the
environmental decision-making process.254
As environmental impact assessment has become
widely utilized by planners and decision-makers throughout
the world, two distinct variations of EIA have emerged:
technocratic and democratic.255 The technocratic version of
EIA is designed to provide information to government
officials and project promoters on the environmental impacts of projects and activities in order to comply with preestablished regulatory standards. 6 It tends to focus on the
physical environment and
may not always identify alterna7
tive courses of action.

The democratic version of EIA is designed to integrate environmental and socioeconomic considerations into
economic planning and to serve as a vehicle for public
involvement in the decision-making process. 2 5 8 It tends to
be process-oriented, externally focused, and open-ended. 9
Early identification of alternatives is a hallmark of this
approach.26 °
While the EIA approach adopted by the ACP in its
EIA manual incorporates socioeconomic considerations
into the EIA process, the ACP's approach is nevertheless
254 See ACP, Informe Social y Ambiental (Social and Environmental

Report) (2003), at 17, 39, availableat
http://www.pancanal.com/common/general/reports/acp-social_
environmental-report-2003.pdf.
255

See DAVID B. SMITH & MIEKE VAN DER WANSEM, STRENGTHENING

EIA
256 CAPACITY IN ASIA 1-2 (World Resources Institute 1995).
See id. at 1.
257 See id.
258 See id. at 1-2.
259 See id. at 2.
260

See id.
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more akin to the technocratic rather than the democratic
EJA model. 26 1 Even though the ACP has developed proce-

dures for public involvement, 262 the ACP's EIA manual
omits several important elements that are essential to the
promotion of robust public debate about the environmental
and socioeconomic impacts of proposed projects.
First, the ACP's EIA manual neglects to emphasize
the importance of EIA as a planning tool and fails to provide guidance on precisely when an EIA should be developed. In the absence of explicit guidance about the timing
of environmental review, there is a danger that the EIA will
not be prepared until after a decision has been made (as
occurred with the Canal expansion project) and will become a post-hoc rationalization rather than a deliberative
document designed to facilitate the evaluation of the proposed project by the public and by government officials.
Second, the EIA manual should require public input
on the scope of the EIA and the issues to be analyzed at the
earliest possible stage in the EIA process.263 For example,
the public should have been invited to comment on the
design of the EIA for the proposed Canal expansion project
well in advance of the referendum. By involving the public
at a preliminary stage in the EIA process, the ACP would
have received early notice of the public's key concerns and
would have had the opportunity to produce an EIA (prior to
the referendum) designed to foster meaningful public de-

261

See ACP, supra note 128.

262

The ACP provided the author with its public involvement guide-

lines at the conclusion of a meeting with the ACP staff on December
13, 2007. See ACP, Procedimiento Para la Realizaci6n del Foro Pfiblico
(on file with the author); ACP, ProcedimientoParala Preparaci6nde
un Plan de Divulgaci6ny Consulta PNiblica (on file with the author).
263 For example, under the U.S. regulations implementing NEPA,

federal agencies are required to invite citizens to participate in the EIA
scoping process in order to identify major issues well in advance of the
preparation of the EJA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1978).
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bate about the costs and benefits of the proposed Canal
expansion and its alternatives.
Third, the ACP's EIA manual should require the
identification and analysis of alternatives to the proposed
action (including the no action alternative) and should provide guidance on how to evaluate these alternatives. As
explained in Part II of this article, the alternatives discussion drives the EIA analysis because it enables the public
and the government to compare the environmental and
socioeconomic costs and benefits of alternative ways of
achieving a particular objective. If the EIA is prepared
after alternatives have been foreclosed (as occurred with
the Canal expansion), the public participation process becomes a meaningless ritual that frustrates and disempowers
the communities affected by the proposed project.
Fourth, the ACP's EIA manual should promote
meaningful dialogue about the project and its alternatives
by requiring the ACP to articulate and provide a detailed
response to the concerns voiced by the proposed project's
opponents. In so doing, the EIA manual would force the
ACP to analyze new information supplied by the public and
would reassure the public that its contributions will be
valued and taken seriously.
Finally, the ACP should make its EIA manual and
public involvement guidelines available on its website so
that members of the public can understand and monitor the
EIA process.
Because the ACP's EIA manual is consistent with
the EIA regulations promulgated by ANAM in Executive
Decree 209, 264 the recommendations set forth herein apply
with equal force to ANAM's EIA regulations. Indeed,
given ANAM's statutory obligation to protect the environment and to promote public participation, it is essential that
ANAM take a leadership role in promoting a democratic
rather than technocratic conception of EIA. Although
264 See

Executive Decree 209, supra note 137.
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ANAM's EIA manual is vastly superior in this respect to
the ACP's EIA manual, ANAM's EIA regulations generally provide little to no guidance on the key EIA reforms
proposed herein.
As Panama struggles to rid itself of its authoritarian
legacy, the adoption of a democratic conception of EIA and
the promotion of public participation in government decision-making will fulfill several important objectives. The
first objective is to generate additional information. The
EIA process invites the public to present additional information and perspectives to decision-makers in order to help
overcome bureaucratic inertia or tunnel vision.265 The
second objective is to enhance government accountability.
Public participation mechanisms facilitate public oversight
of government decision-making by requiring decision266
makers to publicly justify and explain their decisions.
The third objective is to create formal mechanisms for
public input in order to prevent government "capture" by
powerful economic interests.267 In the absence of such
mechanisms, the public would lack the resources, the "insider" relationships, and the organization to influence the
decision-making process.268 Finally, public participation
mechanisms promote democratization and civic engagement by fostering informed and reasoned debate about
whether a particular project or decision will promote the
common good. 26 9 The democratic conception of the EIA
process is particularly compelling in the case of the Panama
Canal in light of the Canal's economic and symbolic significance to the Panamanian nation and in light of the danger that this valuable resource will be "captured" by the
economic elite.
265 See Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental

Decisionmaking,78 TEMPLE L. REv. 659, 677 (2005).
266

See id. at 677-78.
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While the recommended reforms are an important
first step in ensuring that the Canal expansion debacle will
not be replicated in the evaluation of other projects, public
participation in the development planning process will not
become a reality in the absence of the political will to depart from the country's authoritarian past and to embrace a
more democratic conception of the common good.
Conclusion
The Panama Canal case study illustrates the ways in
which the colonial legacy frustrates the development planning process in post-colonial societies and highlights the
importance of public participation as a counterweight to the
persistence of colonial institutions and practices. In addition to the domestic, legal, and political constraints discussed in this article, Panama's options with respect to the
Canal are profoundly constrained by the interests of the
Canal's users: the international shipping industry and the
countries whose merchandise traverses the Canal (particularly the United States, China, Korea, Japan and the European Union).27 ° While an analysis of these international
constraints is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to remember that Panama's destiny (at least in the
foreseeable future) will continue to be shaped by its strategic location at the crossroads of international trade.
Whether the Canal will be managed in the interests of the
Panamanian people will depend on the country's ability to
overcome the domestic legacy of colonialism and to skillfully manage the challenges posed by the international
economic order.
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